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About the Virginia Coastal Policy Clinic
The Virginia Coastal Policy Clinic (VCPC) at William & Mary Law School 
pro¬vides science-based legal and policy analysis of environmental and land use 
issues affecting the state’s coastal resources and educates the Virginia policy making, 
non-profit, legal and business communities about these subjects. 
Working in partnership with Virginia scientists, law students in the clinic integrate the 
latest science with legal and policy analysis to solve coastal resource management is¬sues. 
Examining issues ranging from property rights to federalism, the clinic’s activities are 
inherently interdisciplinary, drawing on scientific, economic, and policy expertise from 
across the university. VCPC has a strong partnership with the Virginia Institute of Marine 
Science (VIMS) and Virginia Sea Grant. 
VCPC is especially grateful to the Virginia Environmental Endowment for providing 
generous funding to establish the clinic in fall 2012. 
A Note from the VCPC Director
VCPC received funding from the Virginia Environmental Endowment to produce a series 
of white papers analyzing legal issues Virginia localities may face as they respond and adapt 
to increased flooding caused by sea level rise. To focus the students’ analysis, we selected 
two Virginia jurisdictions—Norfolk and Poquoson—to analyze. The students utilized facts 
from published reports and press accounts to inform their work. Although we focused on 
these two jurisdictions, the issues raised are broadly applicable to similarly situated 
cities in Virginia. The reader should be aware, however, that the legal issues that county 
govern¬ments may face might be different from those in the city government context. 
Future work is likely to involve interviews, additional analysis, and engagement with 
the broader policy community about some of the issues raised. Adapting to flooding and 
sea level rise is a complex area. We have not identified all of the possible legal issues that 
may arise. Nor have we necessarily answered every possible legal question as part of the 
analysis that was conducted. We hope, however, that our white papers begin to answer 
some of the threshold questions facing Virginia localities at this time. We also anticipate 
that they lay the groundwork for in-depth work and identify areas of needed discussion 
and additional research. We therefore welcome any feedback on our work. 
Finally, a special thanks goes to Chris Olcott, a rising third-year law student and 
Virginia Sea Grant Summer Fellow, for source-checking and editing this white paper. 
VCPC is also grateful to Virginia Sea Grant for funding the VCPC Summer Fellow 
program at William & Mary Law School. 
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Introduction
In response to a rising sea levels, Norfolk is contemplating and has already undertaken 
several measures designed to effectively combat the growing threats posed by significant 
flooding and storm surge. One of the many questions facing the city is whether these 
measures would open it up to “takings” claims brought by private citizens. There are three 
adaptation measures that are particularly feasible for the city and therefore constitute the 
focus of the following analysis: condemning private property, building physical structures 
on privately owned property, and building physical structures on public property which 
affect the views of neighboring waterfront property owners. Each measure is constitutionally 
sound from the perspective of the Takings doctrine as long as Norfolk follows certain 
statutorily prescribed guidelines and procedures.
The Government, Including the City of Norfolk,   
Can Take Private Property
The United States Constitution empowers the government to transfer private property 
to itself.1  This is referred to as the power of “eminent domain.”2   The government is 
restricted in its exercise of this power.  First, the transfer, otherwise known as a taking, 
must be for a public purpose.3  Second, the government must pay the property owner an 
appropriate amount of compensation.4
State, county, town, and city governments, including the City of Norfolk, are 
also authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain, but it is similarly restricted.5 
According to the Virginia Constitution, a government like the City of Norfolk can 
take privately owned property if it will further the public’s interest, or use.6  There is a 
wide range of objectives that may fall within the purview of “public use.”7  Put simply, a 
“public use” is an action that is reasonably related to a plausible public purpose.8  Even the 
“elimination of a public nuisance existing on [a] property,”9  the establishment of storm 
Key Points
Norfolk Adaptation Measure Norfolk’s Risk of Being Sued UnderTakings 
Doctrine
Condemnation of Private Property • Little to no risk as long as Norfolk pays just 
compensation and follows specific guidelines, 
which are discussed in the full analysis below.
Physical Construction (e.g., sea walls, culverts, 
pumps) on Privately Owned Property
• Little to no risk as long as Norfolk pays just 
compensation and satisfies certain criteria, 
which are discussed in the full analysis below.
Physical Construction on Public Property Which 
Affects Private Property Owners’ Waterfront Views
• Little to no risk as there is no present right to 
an unobstructed view in Virginia, and Norfolk 
would not have to pay just compensation.
If Norfolk and similarly situated localities want to avoid takings and the payment of just compensation 
altogether, incentivizing private landowners with waterfront properties to build adaptation structures 
such as walls and living shorelines is an option.  In return, the landowner would receive a plot of land that 
would otherwise be part of the public shore.
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 Key Point
Criteria for a Constitutionally  
AcceptableTaking:
 
 1) Privately held property interest
 2) Government reduces that interest
 3) Taking is for public use
4) Government pays just 
compensation
water management facilities,10 and the condemnation of “oyster beds and grounds” can 
constitute a public use under Virginia law.11  While the thrust of the taking must be guided 
by public considerations, courts have recently clarified that in the context of a taking, a 
taking may benefit a private landowner as long as the benefit is incidental to achieving 
the intended public purpose.12  When taking private property for public use, the 
government may only take that amount of private property which is “necessary to 
achieve the stated public use.”13  
State, county, city, or town government must also pay “just compensation” 
to a landowner in exchange for taking land.14  According to the Virginia 
Constitution, the compensation must amount to at least “the value of the 
property taken, lost profits and lost access, and damages to the residue caused 
by the taking.”15  Therefore, the City of Norfolk would be required to pay just 
compensation if it “takes” a property.
These limitations on the government’s ability to take private property—the 
public use, amount, and compensation requirements—are designed to protect 
private property rights and to ensure that private citizens are not forced to pay the 
toll for a benefit that accrues to the general public.16   
There are two ways by which the government, including the City of Norfolk, can take 
private property for public use:
 • A physical taking occurs when the government appropriates the property or physically 
intrudes, such as by building a structure.17 
 • A regulatory taking occurs when the government adopts a regulation that strips the 
landowner of all or substantially all “economically viable use” of the property.18  
If a private citizen brings a takings claim against the government for either a 
physical or regulatory action, a court will consider four elements in determining 
whether the taking was constitutional and therefore permitted.  First, the private 
citizen must demonstrate that he has a valid property interest in the property 
he claims is being taken.19  State law will define whether a specific interest 
is a valid property interest for the sake of a takings claim.20   Second, there 
must be some government action that chips away at that interest.21  This is 
accomplished through either a physical or regulatory action, as defined above. 
Third, the court will evaluate whether the government took the private 
property for public use; if the purpose of the taking does not fall within the 
purview of “public use,” then the court will find that the government is acting 
outside the scope of its constitutionally authorized power and the taking will be 
deemed unconstitutional.22  Fourth, the court will consider whether the private 
citizen received just compensation in exchange for the government encroaching 
on his property interest; if the compensation was inadequate, then the taking will be 
considered unconstitutional.23
Norfolk’s Susceptibility to Takings Claims
Norfolk is unlikely to be sued by a private citizen under the takings doctrine for adopting 
certain adaptation measures designed to counteract the dangers posed by flooding and 
storm surge. However, there are guidelines and procedures that the city must follow in 
 Key Point
 Who Can Take Private Property?
  1) Federal government
  2) State government
  3) Local government
 What is Required for a Taking?
  1) Public Use
  2) Just Compensation
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order for its actions to remain protected under federal and state law. The following three 
adaptation measures—condemnation of private property, building structures on privately 
owned property, and building structures that affect a private property owner’s waterfront 
view—are all viable options for Norfolk as it develops strategies and formulates plans for 
protecting its citizens and properties against the effects of sea level rise.
Adaptation Measure 1: Condemnation of Private Property 
Overview
The City of Norfolk can acquire any private property through a voluntary contractual 
sale. If the owner refuses to sell, then the city has the ability to condemn private 
property in order to achieve a public purpose—such as flood protection. As long 
as the city follows certain steps and has a valid public purpose for condemning the 
property, it is unlikely to be sued under the takings doctrine. The most notable steps 
include first making an offer to purchase the targeted land from the landowners, and, 
if such a contractual sale is not possible, then the city must provide the landowners 
with just compensation in exchange for condemning the land pursuant to its 
statutorily authorized power of eminent domain.24   If condemnation occurs, then the 
city must adopt measures that will assist the displaced residents in finding alternative 
accommodations. 
Discussion
Norfolk may desire to condemn private property within its city limits in order to 
halt rebuilding in areas particularly susceptible to consistent flooding or to use the 
land in the course of operating services that protect other life and property. Norfolk’s 
condemnation of private property is permissible because it is in keeping with its 
constitutionally authorized powers of eminent domain,25  but the city must meet 
certain criteria.
First, under Virginia law, Norfolk must initially attempt to purchase the property 
from the private landowners.26  If a contractual sale is not feasible, then Norfolk may 
begin the taking process.27 
Second, then, the taking must be for a public use. Protecting against flooding 
and the damages thereof is an action reasonably related to public safety and 
welfare.28  Therefore, it constitutes a “public use.”29  
Third, the city must pay compensation.  The compensation may be two-
fold.  First, the city must justly compensate the private landowners for the 
land taken.30  The amount of compensation is the “sum as the governing 
body estimates to be the fair value of the property taken and damage, if any, 
done to the residue.”31  In addition, Norfolk must pay compensation to any 
residents—whether homeowners or tenants—that are displaced as a result of 
the condemnation.  Under Virginia law, when a locality or other state agency 
takes real estate and consequently displaces a person, the locality must pay to the 
“displaced” person “fair and reasonable relocation payments.”32  Therefore, if Norfolk 
condemns a residence or residential area, for example Spartan Village, then the city 
must pay compensation to the displaced residents as well as the landowners. 
 Key Point
Criteria for a Constitutionally 
Acceptable Condemnation of Private 
Property:
 1) Pre-condemnation attempt to   
 purchase
 2) Public use
 3) Compensation to landowners and  
 displaced residents
 4) Adherence to specific procedures 
(e.g., public hearings and 
displacement control plans)
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Fourth, Norfolk must effectuate its condemnation through specific procedures. 
The condemnation must be carried out in accordance with a process—which includes 
public hearings—as outlined in the Virginia Code.33  One of the more notable aspects 
of this process is that if the condemnation results in the displacement of residents or 
tenants,34  then the city is required to specifically plan for that displacement.35  The 
plan must reflect Norfolk’s cognizance of the fact that the condemnation will cause 
a forced removal of residents and that this diaspora may cause problems.36  The plan 
must also contemplate how those problems will be mitigated.37
Adaptation Measure 2: Building Structures on Privately Owned Property
Overview
If the City of Norfolk constructs sea walls, culverts, drains, pumps, or other structures 
to protect property from flooding and those structures are placed on private property, 
then the city is likely to withstand a challenge that the taking is unconstitutional 
if it meets certain criteria. First, the taking of the privately owned property must 
be primarily for the benefit of the public. This will not be difficult for the city to 
demonstrate in the context of sea level rise and storm surge control. Second, the amount 
of land that is taken must not exceed the amount that is necessary to accomplish the 
public good. Third, the city must pay just compensation to the landowner. If these 
elements are satisfied, then the city should be able to withstand a claim brought by a 
private landowner that the taking is unconstitutional.
Discussion 
If the City of Norfolk erects a structure on privately owned property, then 
this action would constitute a physical taking. The property owner’s right to 
exclusive use of the property and his right to exclude others from his property 
are negatively affected when the city comes onto his property and physically 
occupies a portion of it by building a structure for the benefit of the public. 
The size of the structure is irrelevant, as any physical invasion constitutes a 
taking.38  The U.S. Supreme Court has been exceedingly clear on this point 
in the past: “any . . . addition of  . . . material, or artificial structure placed on 
land, if done under statutes authorizing it for the public benefit, is such a taking 
as, by the constitutional provisions, demands compensation.”39
Therefore, there must be compensation for the physical intrusion, even though 
the structure being built is an adaptation measure intended to mitigate the harmful 
effects of sea level rise and storm surge and consequently furthers the public good. 
Unfortunately, there is unlikely to be any exception to this compensation requirement.
 The United States Supreme Court has held in the past that in wartime emergency 
situations, compensation for a physical destruction of private property in battle is not 
necessary.40  But, this exception does not extend to a seizure of domestic property 
during a war.41  Storm surge and recurrent flooding do not constitute such an 
emergency situation.
Various state Supreme Courts, including Virginia’s, have allowed an exception to 
the payment of just compensation when private property needed to be destroyed out of 
public necessity.42  The public necessity doctrine has been invoked where governments 
  Key Point
 If Norfolk builds a structure on private  
 property in order to mitigate the hazards  
 of sea level rise and recurrent flooding,   
 then Norfolk will be required to pay  
 the private property owner just   
 compensation.
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acted to stop a fire from spreading or a pestilence from multiplying.43  The City of 
Norfolk would be unable to successfully argue that constructing a permanent object 
on privately owned land for the purpose of mitigating the hazards of sea level rise is 
a necessary response to an emergency situation. While sea level rise and storm surge 
certainly pose foreseeable danger, they do not pose immediate harms that require 
intervention: as would an outbreak of fire or disease.44  This exception only allows 
governments to resist compensation where the use or destruction of property prevents 
imminent harm. 
In the absence of an exception, the City of Norfolk will be required to pay the 
landowner just compensation for the structure it builds on the landowner’s property 
as the action constitutes a physical taking. While the city’s power of eminent domain 
would allow it to build flood mitigation structures on private property in exchange for 
just compensation, it is a course of action that the city has not readily engaged in, at 
least in the last decade.45  Federal funding could make this more desirable.
If the City of Norfolk wants to avoid takings and the payment of just 
compensation altogether, perhaps it could follow other states and incentivize 
private landowners with waterfront properties to build the adaptation structures—
e.g., walls and living shorelines—along the perimeter of their property and the 
public shoreline (especially if it is the shoreline of a tidal land). 46  In return for 
undertaking the construction, the landowner would receive a plot of land that would 
otherwise be part of the public shore.47   With this property right, the landowner could 
prevent the general public from openly accessing the “area inland from the wall.”48 
Maryland has been particularly active in adopting this strategy.49  One long term 
benefit of this alternative approach is that it may reduce the flooding risk to certain 
residential areas. However, this piecemeal approach may not provide the optimal 
public benefit for the benefits granted to the private owner: an owner is granted more 
property for placing a structure along one piece of property, which may provide no 
appreciable flood reduction to the broader area.50  The potential reduced risk may 
alleviate any future need of the City of Norfolk to condemn the property and displace 
the residents in order to protect life and property. Currently, however, this is not an 
option under consideration.51
Adaptation Measure 3: Building Structures that Affect a Private Property 
Owner’s Waterfront View
Overview
If the City of Norfolk erects structures on public property, for instance a sea wall, and 
those structures obstruct a neighboring landowner’s view of the water, then the city is 
likely acting within the scope of its authority and not at risk of a taking. Government 
actions that result in a partial diminution of the value of private property are only 
compensable where they interfere with a property right held by the property owner.52 
Thus, if a sea wall or other adaptation structure built on neighboring land reduces the 
value of a property, but fails to interfere with a recognized property right, there will 
be no compensation.53  
Virginia recognizes and protects specific property rights for coastal property 
owners, called riparian rights, but unlike some other states such as Florida, there is 
It should be noted that 
this discussion will not 
analyze the permit process 
associated with building 
structures.  That is outside 
the scope of this Paper.
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no jurisprudence or statute that suggests that Virginia considers the right to an 
unobstructed view a protected property right. Because a Virginia court is unlikely 
to find a coastal landowner has a protected property right in maintaining a scenic 
view, any takings claim brought by a riparian landowner in Norfolk on this basis 
will probably fail. 
Discussion
Norfolk may build sea walls and other flood and storm surge mitigating 
structures that affect the interests of landowners owning adjacent property. 
While these structures may not be on the landowner’s private property, they 
may negatively impact the neighboring landowner’s interest in an unobstructed 
view of the water and may diminish the value of his or her property. Florida 
treats the right to an unobstructed view as a protected “riparian right” and any 
government interference with that view is a taking.54  However, an interest in 
an unobstructed view presently is not treated as a valid property right in Virginia: 
placing a sea wall upon public property that limits this view and diminishes the value 
of the private property is not a compensable taking.
In Virginia, a riparian right is defined as “a qualified property right[s] incident to 
the ownership of the soil through or by which the waters of a stream flow.”55  Virginia 
landowners are given “exclusive rights and privileges to and along the shores of the 
waters bordering their land down to ordinary low water mark.”56   The Virginia 
Supreme Court has recognized five types of riparian rights for Virginia landowners:
 • The right to be and remain a riparian proprietor and to enjoy the natural advantages 
thereby conferred upon the land by its adjacency to the water.
 • The right of access to the water, including a right of way to and from the navigable 
part.
 • The right to build a pier or wharf out to navigable water, subject to any regulations 
of the State.
 • The right to accretions or alluvium.
 • The right to make a reasonable use of the water as it flows past or laves the land.57
These riparian rights are subject to the government’s eminent domain power, 
which means that they may be “taken” by the government as long as the government 
satisfies the taking criteria (e.g., public use, just compensation).58   However, the 
focus of this discussion is on the right to an unobstructed view of the water.  This is 
not explicitly recognized as a riparian right in Virginia.  It could be construed as a 
reasonable interpretation of one of Virginia’s recognized riparian rights: “Right to be 
and remain a riparian proprietor and to enjoy the natural advantages thereby conferred 
upon the land by its adjacency to the water.”59  However, while Florida recognizes 
an unobstructed view as a legally protected riparian right, Virginia’s neighbor, West 
Virginia, does not: “A riparian owner has no proprietary right in a beautiful scene 
presented by a river any more than any other owner of land could claim to a beautiful 
landscape.”60  In fact, Florida is the only state that recognizes a riparian right to an 
unobstructed view.61  Because of this, it is likely that the city can build a structure that 
obstructs a landowner’s view, so long as the structure does not interfere with any other 
riparian rights.
  Key Point
 Rights to Views
 1) Not a protected property right in  
 Virginia
 2) Norfolk may build a structure that  
	 impedes	a	landowner’s	view	of	the	
water with minimal risk of a Takings 
claim     
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However, there is no precedent rejecting a riparian right to an unobstructed 
view, so a Virginia court could create such a right if it deems it appropriate under 
the circumstances.62  This is most likely to happen if an adaptation a structure severely 
or completely eliminates a property owner’s water view, causing a total, or near-total, 
destruction of the value of the property. Although there is no present riparian right 
to an unobstructed view, the city should be mindful when designing and placing 
structures that a court may create such a right to protect a sympathetic landowner. 
Still, the Virginia Supreme Court has recently held that a plaintiff cannot “state a 
cause of action for declaratory relief for inverse condemnation when the sole damage 
alleged was a diminution in value arising from the public use of proximately located 
property.”63  After that decision—where the Court refused to allow compensation 
for diminution of value in a landlocked property—it is less likely that the Court will 
manufacture a riparian right to permit such compensation in cases involving coastal 
property. Thus, it is unlikely that the city will have to provide compensation where a 
seawall obstructs a landowners view of the water.
Conclusion
The City of Norfolk has the power of eminent domain, meaning that it can lawfully “take” 
privately owned property for public use as long as it pays the landowner just compensation. 
It may effectuate this Taking by adopting a measure that prohibits the property from being 
used in such as way as to create economic value.  Alternatively, the Taking may occur if the 
City physically occupies any portion of the privately held land. 
Norfolk may use this power to condemn private property in order to protect the 
property and any people living on the property from the harmful effects of storm surge 
and recurrent flooding. In order to remain within the bounds of its authority, Norfolk 
must first offer to purchase this property through a contractual sale, but if such a sale is 
not possible, then Norfolk must pay the landowners just compensation. The City must be 
particularly careful if the condemned land is also residential.  If residents are consequently 
displaced, then the City must plan for their displacement and assist them in finding 
alternative accommodations. As long as Norfolk follows this statutorily prescribed process, 
then Norfolk is unlikely to be subject to a Takings claim. 
In addition to private property condemnation, Norfolk may use its power of eminent 
domain to construct sea walls, bulkheads, and other flood mitigating structures on privately 
owned property. While the City has yet to embrace this course of action, such a plan is 
legally permissible. Because the City would be physically occupying a portion of privately 
owned land, the City would have to pay the landowner just compensation, take no more 
land than what is required for the construction, and demonstrate that the purpose of 
the construction was to primarily benefit the public. Given the increasing intensity and 
frequency of flooding in Norfolk, it will not be difficult for the City to demonstrate how 
a flood mitigation structure (such as a sea wall) will further the public’s safety and welfare, 
and thus advance the public good. In summation, if the City decides to adopt this type of 
measure, then it would be acting within the scope of its authority. 
The City of Norfolk may also build structures on public property and consequently 
impede a neighboring property owner’s view of the water without opening itself up to 
a Takings claim. While Virginia does recognize riparian rights, it is distinct from some 
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other states in that Virginia is unlikely to treat the right to an unobstructed view as a 
legally protected property right. A valid Takings claim requires the plaintiff landowner 
to demonstrate that he has a legally protected property right that is being infringed upon 
by the government. In the context of scenery, while a Norfolk riparian landowner’s view 
may be infringed upon by the government if the government erects a flood mitigating 
structure, such a view is unlikely protected in the first place, and therefore cannot form 
the basis of a valid Takings claim. If Norfolk builds a structure on public land that 
obstructs a private property owner’s view, then a Takings claim brought by the 
landowner on this basis will likely fail.
In conclusion, it is evident that Norfolk has little susceptibility to a Takings 
claim if it adopts any or all of the above adaptation measures. When planning 
these efforts, the City must be sure to satisfy the constitutional and statutory 
requirements. As long as the condemnation process and the construction of 
sea walls, pumps, and other flood mitigating structures are carried out in 
accordance with these requirements, the City may move towards creating a 
safer, drier community without running the risk of liability under the Takings 
doctrine. 
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